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cued recall. In Experiment 2, the initial test was free recall and the final test was cued recall. In Experiment 3,
both the initial and final tests were free recall. Initial testing increased misinformation reporting on the final
test for peripheral details in all experiments, but the effect was significant for central details only after
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Abstract (200 words) 
 
Immediately recalling a witnessed event can increase people’s susceptibility to later post-
event misinformation.  But this retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES) effect has only been 
shown when the initial recall test included specific questions that reappeared on the final test.  
Moreover, it is unclear whether this phenomenon is affected by the centrality of event details.  
These limitations make it difficult to generalize RES to criminal investigations, which often 
begin with free recall prior to more specific queries from legal officials and attorneys.  In three 
experiments, we examined the influence of test formats (free recall versus cued recall) and 
centrality of event details (central versus peripheral) on RES.  In Experiment 1, both the initial 
and final tests were cued recall.  In Experiment 2, the initial test was free recall and the final test 
was cued recall.  In Experiment 3, both the initial and final tests were free recall.  Initial testing 
increased misinformation reporting on the final test for peripheral details in all experiments, but 
the effect was significant for central details only after aggregating the data from all three 
experiments.  These results show that initial free recall can produce RES, and more broadly, that 
free recall can potentiate subsequent learning of complex prose materials. 
 Keywords: misinformation effect, eyewitness memory, investigative interviewing, false 
memory, testing effect 
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Retrieval Enhances Eyewitness Suggestibility to Misinformation in Free and Cued Recall  
Misinformation is detrimental to the accuracy of eyewitness memory reports (Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1975; for a review, see Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013).  Because eyewitness 
testimony serves a crucial role in the legal system, discovering techniques that could reduce 
eyewitness suggestibility to misinformation is highly desirable.  One potential technique is 
retrieval practice.  The testing effect, which refers to enhanced retention due to retrieval practice  
(for a recent review, see Roediger, Putman, & Smith, 2011), has generated considerable research 
interest.  If retrieval practice enhances memory of a witnessed event, then this enhancement 
would seem likely to reduce misinformation suggestibility.  However, contrary to this possibility, 
retrieval practice can sometimes increase the negative influence of misleading suggestions on 
eyewitness memory performance — a finding termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES, 
Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009).  Due to the frequency that witnesses engage in repeated 
retrieval, it is prudent to examine the conditions under which recalling details of a witnessed 
event might, or might not, produce RES. 
Although the RES effect has been reported in various procedures (e.g., Chan & Langley, 
2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; 2013), several important aspects of its generality remain unclear.  
Specifically, all studies demonstrating RES possess two characteristics.  First, the initial test was 
administered in a cued recall format, with questions querying specific details of the witnessed 
event.  Second, event details contradicted by misinformation were mostly peripheral in nature 
(e.g., the type of car driven by a person, the color of the shirt worn by a person).  The present 
research investigates whether initial retrieval increases suggestibility only under these conditions 
by examining a) whether RES occurs when the initial test is free recall and b) whether the RES 
effect occurs for both central and peripheral event details. 
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Applied Implications of Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility 
From an applied perspective, it is crucial to understand whether the RES effect 
generalizes to situations in which initial recall does not resemble a cued recall test.  Instead of 
asking questions about specific details of the witnessed event, criminal investigations often begin 
when witnesses call 9-1-1 and are asked to “tell everything,” which is far more similar to a free 
recall test than a cued recall test.  Indeed, the free recall report provided by an eyewitness during 
the early stages of an investigation can dictate how an investigation proceeds (e.g., if a witness 
recalls that the perpetrator is a white male, this information would constrain the subsequent 
search to suspects with similar characteristics), including what follow-up questions are asked by 
the investigators during subsequent interviews (e.g., if a witness recalls that the perpetrator got 
away in a car, the investigator might ask what type of car, etc.).  Beyond reports to 911 
operators, free recall is also prominently featured in all of the major standardized investigative 
interview protocols, including the Stepwise Interview (Yuille, Hunter, Joffe, & Zaparniuk, 
1993), the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992), the Achieving Best Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings Interview (formerly Memorandum of Good Practice, Home Office, 1992, 
2001), and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol 
(Lamb, 2007).  Consequently, free recall plays a major role in criminal investigations.  Because 
RES has only been demonstrated with an initial cued recall test, little is known about whether 
free recall retrieval practice would increase subsequent eyewitness suggestibility or produce a 
testing benefit.  Indeed, if the RES effect is limited to situations for which initial recall involves 
the presentation of specific questions, then this constraint must be taken into account when 
considering the applicability of RES to criminal investigations.  On the other hand, observing 
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RES following initial free recall would greatly increase its generality and potential applicability 
to criminal investigations. 
Of additional importance to the generality and applicability of RES is the effect of item 
centrality.  Memory for central details is typically less susceptible to misinformation than 
memory for peripheral details (Heath & Erickson, 1998; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008, but see 
also Dalton & Daneman, 2006, who reported the opposite).  In fact, some studies have 
demonstrated that memory for central details is not at all susceptible to the influence of 
misinformation (Loftus, 1979; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Wright & Stroud, 1998).  
Currently, there is no general consensus on how best to define item centrality.  Some researchers 
have defined central and peripheral information as details that are important and incidental to the 
thrust of the witnessed event, respectively (Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Loftus 1979; Wright & 
Stroud, 1998).  Others defined centrality based on the frequency that those details are reported in 
free recall, with more frequently recalled items classified as central and less frequently recalled 
items as peripheral (Heath & Erickson, 1998; Saunders, 2009).  We opted to define item 
centrality in the latter way because this definition is quantifiable and arguably more objective.  If 
centrality had been defined by subjective norms applied by the experimenters or participants, it 
would be difficult to identify the precise criteria used to separate the central from the peripheral 
details.  Further, subjective opinion regarding what is central versus peripheral to an event can 
vary greatly from one person to the next; this variation might have contributed to the disputed 
vulnerability of central details to misinformation—even among studies that adopted similar 
methods of experimenter-defined central and peripheral items (Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Wright 
& Stroud, 1998).  By our definition, central items are necessarily easier to remember than 
peripheral items, and would likely be more resistant to misinformation (Holliday, Douglas, & 
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Hayes, 1999; Marche, 1999; Okado & Stark, 2005).  Therefore, we expect the central items to be 
accompanied by a much smaller misinformation effect than the peripheral items.  The interesting 
unknown is whether initial testing would increase suggestibility for these central items.  
Importantly, even if item centrality were found to affect the magnitude of RES (e.g., that 
only peripheral details are susceptible to RES), the phenomenon would not be rendered trivial for 
several reasons.  First, event details that are less memorable or less central are not necessarily 
less important in the context of a criminal investigation.  Crimes are often complex and what 
constitutes important information cannot be easily predicted.  Indeed, the course of an 
investigation can often lead investigators to reassess the relative importance or unimportance of 
specific pieces of evidence.  Second, and perhaps even more importantly, witnesses who 
incorporate peripheral details into their memory reports are perceived as more credible than 
those who omit such details (Bell & Loftus, 1988; 1989; Wells & Leippe, 1981).  Thus, 
examining potential moderators of RES (such as item centrality) could help to further illuminate 
its application in legal contexts. 
Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility 
Proposed theoretical mechanisms underlying RES are beginning to emerge.1  One  
                                                
 
1 One account suggests that memory for the original event must undergo reconsolidation after 
initial retrieval (Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010), and presentation of the misinformation 
disrupts this reconsolidation process, thus impairing later retrieval of the original memory (Chan 
et al., 2009; Chan et al., 2012; Chan & LaPaglia, 2013).  We do not dwell on the reconsolidation 
hypothesis in this paper because these experiments were not designed to address this possibility. 
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account ascribes RES to preferential encoding of the misinformation following initial testing 
(Chan et al., 2009; Thomas, Bulevich, & Chan, 2010).  For explication purposes, we refer to this 
notion as the attention allocation hypothesis (Chan, Wilford, & Hughes, 2012; Thomas et al., 
2010).  The attention allocation account posits that the initial test questions serve as cues for the 
later presented misinformation.  For example, if a participant is asked about the type of vehicle 
driven by the perpetrator, this question might draw attention to that detail later, causing 
participants to preferentially encode the relevant misinformation.  Essentially, this is similar to 
the prequestions effect in the education literature, where providing students with a set of 
questions before they read an essay often facilitates learning of that essay.  More specifically, the 
prequestions effect is characterized by enhanced recall of information specifically targeted by or 
related to the prequestions, whereas recall of information unrelated to the prequestions is 
diminished (Hamaker, 1986).  The occurrence of this effect has been attributed to increased 
attention paid to the materials queried by the prequestions at the expense of other materials 
(Lewis & Mensink, 2012).  When this experimental phenomenon is applied to the present 
context, RES can be explained by increased attention to the later misinformation because the 
initial test included questions related to the misinformation.  To be clear, as is presently 
conceived, the attention allocation hypothesis suggests that RES is the direct result of asking 
witnesses specific questions during the initial test. 
In the present experiments, we provide a test for an extension of the attention allocation 
account by administering the initial test in a free recall format.  All previous demonstrations of 
RES have been limited to protocols with an initial cued recall test.  It is therefore unclear how 
initial free recall would affect encoding of subsequent misinformation and whether RES would 
occur in this context.  It is well known that free recall differs from cued recall on a number of 
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dimensions, including a heavier reliance on recollection (Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003; Tulving, 
1985), self-generated retrieval cues (Burgess & Shallice, 1996), and organization processes 
(Zaromb & Roediger, 2010).  Although a considerable amount of research has demonstrated that 
testing can potentiate subsequent learning (e.g., Arnold & McDermott, 2013; Izawa, 1970), far 
less is known about the processes by which free recall affects subsequent learning of complex 
prose materials (Dunlosky, Rawson, & McDonald, 2009).   
In the present experiments, misinformation was presented in an audio narrative that 
recapitulated much of the witnessed event.  Prior free recall may lead to better organization and 
increased accessibility of details of the witnessed event, which may in turn facilitate 
comprehension and encoding of the postevent narrative (Arnold & McDermott, 2013; Wissman, 
Rawson, & Pyc, 2011).  It is also possible that by completing the initial free recall test, 
participants are better able to anticipate the level of details required to perform well on any 
subsequent memory tests, thus causing a shift in encoding strategy towards remembering details 
(Britton, Glynn, Muth, & Penland, 1985; McCrudden & Schraw, 2007).  Finally, performing an 
initial free recall test provides participants with information about what they have learned well 
and what they have not (Lachman & Laughery, 1968; Padilla-Walker & Poole, 2002; Thompson, 
Wenger, and Bartling, 1978).  When a relearning opportunity arises, the initial test allows 
participants to better allocate their attentional resources to the items that were not well learned 
(Battig, Allen, & Jensen, 1965; Son & Kornell, 2008).  Of particular relevance to the present 
study is whether prior free recall would have different effects on the central and peripheral 
misinformation.  Because peripheral details are unlikely to be reported during the initial free 
recall test (and indeed this was how we operationally define peripheral items in the present 
study), the tested participants might be particularly “sensitive” to these details when they appear 
RETRIEVAL ENHANCED SUGGESTIBILITY 9 
 
 
during the postevent narrative (by virtue of their noticing that these details were omitted from 
their free recall report earlier), thus leading to an RES effect for the peripheral details. 
As this brief theoretical analysis demonstrates, there are reasons to believe that RES 
would occur following initial free recall.  We caution, however, that this is not a foregone 
conclusion and the attention allocation hypothesis would have to be broadened substantially from 
its present form to account for a free recall-based RES effect. 
Overview of the Present Experiments 
In three experiments, we examined whether RES is sensitive to variations in test format 
and item centrality.  In Experiment 1, in keeping with the typical RES procedure, both the initial 
and final tests were cued recall.  This experiment served two purposes.  First, we examined 
whether central and peripheral details are differentially susceptible to RES in the standard 
procedure.  Second, because it is unclear whether RES would occur with a free recall initial test, 
it is important to first establish the effect with the present materials and participant population.   
In Experiment 2, the initial test was administered in a free recall format.  This change 
allowed us to examine whether an initial cued recall test is necessary to produce RES.  In 
Experiment 3, we further tested the generality of RES by using free recall for both the initial and 
final tests.  This experiment serves two purposes.  First, it provides an even more stringent test 
for the generality of RES.  RES has been demonstrated across a variety of final test formats 
including cued recall (Chan et al., 2009), forced choice recognition (Thomas et al., 2010), and 
source discrimination (Chan et al., 2012), but it has yet to be demonstrated in a free recall final 
test.  More importantly, because free recall is based heavily, though certainly not entirely 
(McCabe, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2011; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012), on recollection (Tulving, 
1985), demonstrating RES in a final free recall test would buttress previous claims that 
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misinformation reported in this procedure is due to true source misattributions rather than 
guessing (Chan et al., 2012).  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  Sixty undergraduate students (N = 30 for each testing condition) 
participated in this experiment for course research credit. 
Design.  We used a 2 (Test Condition: test, no-test) x 3 (Item Type: central, peripheral, or 
neutral) mixed-factorial design.  Test condition was manipulated between-subjects whereas item 
type was manipulated within-subjects.  Note that because all participants were administered a 
final test, the test and no-test labels refer only to the presence or absence of the initial test.  
Materials and procedure.  We conducted a pilot study to determine item centrality.  
Participants (N = 20) viewed the 8 min critical event video of a museum burglary.  Afterwards, 
participants were given 20 min to type into a blank Word document, in as much detail as 
possible, the events they remembered from the video.  Each narrative was coded into idea units 
for scoring.  Idea units were considered to be the smallest component of words or phrases that 
conveyed a meaningful idea.  For instance, any early mention of the burglar “zip-lining” or 
“sliding down a rope” would be considered one idea unit concerning how the burglar got to the 
roof of the museum.  Six units recalled frequently were defined as central items (M = .74, SD = 
.23), and six units not recalled frequently were defined as peripheral items (M = .19, SD = .12).  
An additional six units with a range of recall frequencies were designated as neutral (never 
misled) items (M = .34, SD = .26).  The neutral items were included so that not all questions in 
the cued recall tests queried details that were contradicted by misinformation.  These central, 
RETRIEVAL ENHANCED SUGGESTIBILITY 11 
 
 
peripheral, and neutral items dealt with different video details and remained consistent across 
participants and experiments (refer to Appendix).   
In Experiment 1, all participants first viewed the same burglary video used in the pilot 
study.  Afterwards, participants in the test condition completed a cued recall test comprising 18 
non-leading questions (e.g., When the burglar worked to retrieve the diamond in the video, what 
apparatus, if any, was used to retrieve the diamond?).  Each of the 18 questions queried one of 
the six previously designated neutral, peripheral, or central items.  Participants were provided 30 
sec to type in their answers.  After each question, participants were asked to provide a confidence 
rating on a scale from 1 (not very confident) to 5 (very confident).  No feedback was provided 
and participants were not required to answer each question—questions could be left blank but 
could not be skipped.  Following the initial test (which took 10 min), participants in the test 
condition played a videogame for 5 min as a distractor activity.  Participants in the no-test 
condition played the same videogame for 15 min.   
All participants then listened to an audio narrative (~6 min) via headphones.  Participants 
were told that the narrative recapped the burglary video, but they were not told anything specific 
regarding the veracity of the narrative (or that it included misinformation).  Two versions of the 
narrative were constructed and counterbalanced across participants.  The two narratives were 
identical with the exception of the twelve pieces of misinformation (e.g., Version A: the burglar 
used two identical black claws with 3-prongs to retrieve the diamond; Version B: the burglar 
used one silver mechanical 3-pronged arm to retrieve the diamond; Correct Answer: the burglar 
used two silver metal arms with 2 and 3-prongs to retrieve the diamond, refer to Appendix).  
These different sets of misinformation were created to increase generalizability.  The six neutral 
items were not mentioned in either version of the narrative (although they were presented in the 
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video).  After the audio narrative, all participants completed a final cued recall test that was 
identical to the initial test taken by participants in the test condition.  Participants were 
specifically instructed to answer all questions based on what they remembered from the video.   
Results and Discussion 
 We focused our data analyses on the central and peripheral misinformation items, but for 
the sake of completeness, data for the neutral items are also presented (refer to top of Table 1).  
Responses in the cued recall test were coded into one of four categories:  correct, 
misinformation, other intrusions, or no answer (i.e., blank or “I don’t know”).  Other intrusions 
included all responses that matched neither the misinformation nor the correct answer.  A second 
coder re-coded 25% of the initial and final cued recall data to establish coding consistency—
interrater agreement (see Lane, Mather, Villa, & Morita, 2001) reached a proportion of .83 and 
.87 for the initial and final test, respectively.  
Initial cued recall test.  Initial test data will not be discussed in detail but are displayed 
at the top of Table 2.  Of most relevance to our purposes, spontaneous misinformation generation 
was extremely low for the central items (.01) and fairly low for the peripheral items (.11).  
Spontaneous misinformation generation refers to the proportion of misinformation responses 
reported before the misinformation was introduced via the audio narrative (i.e., misinformation 
responses that were spontaneously reported without suggestions).  We now report results from 
the final test. 
Final cued recall test.  Confidence data for the final test are reported in Table 1 (for 
neutral items) and Table 3 (for the central and peripheral items).  We do not elaborate on the data 
regarding confidence because they were not influenced by initial testing.  
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Initial testing increased reports of misinformation on the final test for peripheral items – 
an RES effect, t(58) = 2.38, d = .63, p < .03 (.52 for test and .36 for no-test, see Figure 1).  
Tested individuals were also less likely to report the correct answers for the peripheral items (M 
= .21) than the non-tested individuals (M = .32), t(58) = 2.35, d = .62, p < .03.  Note that correct 
and misinformation recall probabilities were not entirely complimentary due to the presence of 
the other intrusions and no answer response categories.  A conditional analysis was performed to 
examine whether initial recall accuracy affected subsequent suggestibility.  Not surprisingly, the 
effect of misinformation (as measured by the proportion of misinformation recall on the final 
test) was significantly lower for items that participants correctly recalled during the initial test (M 
= .44) relative to items that participants were not able to correctly recall during the initial test (M 
= .58), t(26) = 2.50, d = .47, p =.02.  Note that we define “not able to recall correctly” here as all 
incorrect responses, including “other intrusions,” “no answer,” and “spontaneous false recall.”  
More interestingly, the misinformation recall probability for these initially correct items was still 
numerically (though not significantly, M = .44) higher than that of the non-tested participants (M 
= .36), t(26) = .97, d = .38, p =.34.  This result is particularly impressive given the inherent item 
selection differences built into such a comparison (i.e., the initially correct items for the tested 
participants necessarily reflected the easier and more memorable ones, whereas both easy and 
difficult items were included for the non-tested participants). 
Testing did not affect the likelihood that one would report misinformation for the central 
items, t(58) = 1.41, d = .37, p = .17.  In fact, recall probability of the central misinformation was 
close to floor, although the difference was in the direction of RES (M = .11 for test and M = .06 
for no-test).  Moreover, testing did not alter correct recall probability of central items (M = .54 
for both test and no-test), t(58) = .091, d = .02, p = .93.  Given the way we defined central 
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misinformation (as items with high free recall probabilities), it is not too surprising that these 
items were more resistant to misinformation than the peripheral items.  Moreover, unlike the 
peripheral items, participants’ susceptibility to later central misinformation was not significantly 
affected by whether one correctly recalled the item (M = .14) or not (M = .07) during the initial 
test, t(25) = 1.48, d = .28, p = .15. 
 In sum, we generalized the RES effect to a new set of materials, though the effect 
appeared to be restricted to peripheral details.  We provide a more thorough discussion regarding 
item centrality in the General Discussion.   
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we examined the influence of completing an initial free recall test on 
subsequent eyewitness suggestibility.  As stated in the Introduction, free recall is a major 
component of several investigative interview techniques and 911 protocols, and yet, all extant 
demonstrations of RES occurred with a cued recall initial test.  Therefore, administering the 
initial retrieval attempt in free recall provides an important test for the generality of RES.  
Theoretically, according to the attention allocation hypothesis, initial testing exacerbates 
eyewitness suggestibility because it inadvertently enhances encoding of the later presented 
misinformation.  Again, as is presently conceived, the attention allocation hypothesis makes no 
explicit predictions about whether initial free recall would lead to RES.  However, a modified 
version of the hypothesis, which takes into account the literature on test-potentiated learning, can 
lead one to predict an RES effect following initial free recall.   
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and twenty undergraduate students (N = 60 for each testing 
condition) participated in this experiment. 
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Materials and Procedure.  All materials for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 
1.  The protocol for Experiment 2 differed from the previous experiment in three ways.  All of 
the protocol changes served to provide a better examination of whether initial free recall 
produces RES.  This objective differed from Experiment 1, which primarily served as a 
replication of the focal RES effect with the present materials and participant population.  First, 
participants in the test condition were given a 20 min free recall test (as opposed to a 10 min 
cued recall test).  The free recall test required more time than the cued recall test because 
participants needed to recall event details covering the entire burglary in the former, but only 
details queried by the specific questions in the latter.  Participants were instructed to write a 
detailed description of the video clip they witnessed, and to type their response into a blank 
Word document.  They were encouraged to utilize the entire 20 min period and to be as detailed 
as possible (including facts about actions, settings, props, etc.).  Moreover, at the end of each 5 
min interval, participants were told to “draw” a horizontal line on their Word document.  This 
was done to examine whether participants used (or needed) the entire 20 min for recall.  Instead 
of recalling the video event, participants in the no-test condition were given 20 min to type out a 
description of a childhood story they had seen visually depicted (e.g., Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs); this distractor task served to better equate the level of verbal processing required 
between the test and no-test conditions.  The second procedural difference required that all 
participants watched a ~22 min distractor video after typing out their narratives (rather than 
playing Tetris).  Participants then listened to the same post-event audio misinformation narrative.  
Third, an additional distractor task was inserted between the audio narrative and final test.  In 
this task, participants counted backwards by three starting at 500 for five min.  The final test was 
still administered in a cued recall format and matched that in Experiment 1. 
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Results and Discussion 
Initial free recall test.  A single coder counted the frequency of central, peripheral, and 
neutral items mentioned in the initial free recall narrative.  All of these items were then coded as 
correct, misinformation, or other intrusions.  Any critical items excluded from the free recall 
narratives (i.e., not counted as correct, misinformation, or other intrusions) were considered 
omissions or no answer responses.  Another coder coded 25% of the narratives, and interrater 
agreement was high (.90).  In the initial free recall test, participants accurately reported .27 of the 
neutral items (refer to middle of Table 1), .72 of the central items, and .21 of the peripheral items 
(see middle of Table 2).  These data were similar to those from the pilot experiment.  Further, an 
analysis of the mean number of critical items (i.e., the 18 items designated as central, peripheral, 
and neutral) recalled at each 5 min interval reveals that participants did utilize all 20 min in the 
free recall task (refer to top of Table 4).  Spontaneous misinformation generation was rare for 
both central items (M = .02) and peripheral items (M = .04).     
Final cued recall test.  A single coder coded responses in the recall test into one of four 
categories: correct, misinformation, other intrusions, or no answer (i.e., blank or “I don’t 
know”).  A different coder re-coded 25% of the final cued recall responses to verify the 
consistency of the coding—the coders matched at a proportion of .86.  Once again, confidence 
ratings were not affected by initial testing and these data are presented in Table 1 (neutral items) 
and Table 3 (central and peripheral items).   
Most important for present purposes is that taking an initial free recall test increased the 
report of misinformation in the final cued recall test (refer to Figure 2).  Moreover, similar to 
Experiment 1, this RES effect was evident for peripheral misinformation only.  Initial free recall 
testing increased misinformation recall probability (M = .39 for test and M = .23 for no-test) 
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during the final cued recall test for peripheral items, t(118) = 3.75, d = .69, p < .001.  
Interestingly, the size of this RES effect is comparable to the one reported in Experiment 1 (d = 
.63), which suggests that altering the initial test to free recall did not weaken the impact of initial 
testing on subsequent eyewitness suggestibility.  Tested participants also recalled fewer 
peripheral items correctly relative to non-tested participants (M = .22 for test and M = .29 for no-
test), t(118) = 2.01, d = .37, p < .05.  Thus, we provided an important extension of the RES 
finding to protocols with an initial free recall test.   
Similar to Experiment 1, central misinformation produced very little false recall 
regardless of whether participants were tested previously (M = .08 for test versus M = .04 for no-
test), t(118) = 1.61, d = .30, p = .11.  Correct recall probability for central items also did not 
differ based on testing condition (M = .55 for test and M = .53 for no-test), t < 1, p = .70.2  
In sum, we found that RES is preserved with an initial free recall test.  These results show 
that a cued recall initial test is not necessary for RES to occur.  We discuss the theoretical and 
applied implications of this finding following presentation of the results from Experiment 3.  
 
                                                
 
2 We opted not to conduct a conditional analysis of final false recall probability based on initial 
recall accuracy for Experiments 2 and 3.  There were too few initially incorrect central items (1.7 
observations per participant in Experiment 2 and 0.9 items per participant in Experiment 3) and 
initially correct peripheral items (1.26 observations per participant in Experiments 2 and 3, see 
Table 2) to produce reliable, stable results for the comparison.  Note that “incorrect” central 
items include those coded as “incorrect”, “spontaneous misinformation”, and omitted items.    
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Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we examined whether the RES effect generated by an initial free recall 
test would occur when the final test was also administered in a free recall format.  This is 
important because details reported spontaneously (as in free recall) are often perceived to be 
more accurate than those reported following prompts (as in cued recall).  For example, in the 
trainers’ manual for law enforcement issued by the Department of Justice (2003), law 
enforcement officials are instructed specifically to encourage the witness to volunteer 
information without prompting, because “unprompted responses tend to be more accurate than 
those given in response to an interviewer’s questioning” (p. 19).  Consequently, if the RES effect 
occurs with a final free recall test, it would further bolster the idea that RES has important legal 
implications.  Further, despite the vast literature on eyewitness suggestibility, a surprisingly 
small number of studies have examined the influence of misinformation on free recall 
performance.  Of the few studies that used free recall as the final test, some have failed to 
demonstrate any discernable misinformation effect (Bjorklund, Bjorklund, Brown, & Cassel, 
1998; Bjorklund, Cassell, Bjorklund, et al., 2000).  Therefore, whether initial testing can produce 
confidently held false memories for misinformation that persist in a free recall final test remains 
to be seen (cf., Roediger & McDermott, 1995).    
Method 
Participants.  One hundred and twenty students participated in this experiment, with 60 
each in the test and no-test conditions. 
Materials and procedure.  All experimental protocols were identical to Experiment 2 
with the following exceptions.  First, the distractor video was shortened to ~18 min (from 22 
min) to allow more time for the final free recall test (as opposed to the shorter cued recall final 
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test used in Experiments 1 and 2).  Both the initial and final tests were free recall—the initial test 
was 20 min (just as in Experiment 1), but the final test was increased to 25 min.  The final test 
was increased to 25 min in order to determine the time at which recall approached asymptote.  
The instructions for the final recall test were identical to those for the initial free recall test.  In 
short, participants watched the event video, completed a 20 min free recall test or recalled a 
childhood story, watched an 18 min distractor video, listened to the misinformation audio, 
performed a 5 min distractor task, and concluded with a 25 min final free recall test.   
Results and Discussion 
 A single coder counted the frequency of central, peripheral, and neutral items mentioned 
in both the initial and final free recall narratives.  All of these items were then coded as correct, 
misinformation, or other intrusions, and omitted critical details were coded as “no answer” 
responses.  A second coder independently coded 25% of the narratives.  Interrater agreement 
reached a proportion of .93 and .83 for the initial and final test, respectively. 
Initial free recall test.  Participants accurately recalled .29 of the neutral items (refer to 
bottom of Table 1), .85 of the central items, and .21 of the peripheral items (see the bottom of 
Table 2).  The majority of participants again appeared to engage in the free recall task for the 
entire 20 min (see middle of Table 4).  The frequency of spontaneous misinformation generation 
was again very low for central (M = .01) and peripheral items (M = .03).  Overall, as expected, 
these data are similar to those in Experiment 2. 
 Final free recall test.  Most importantly, the RES effect persisted for peripheral items 
even when both the initial and final tests were administered in a free recall format.  Similar to 
previous reports, the free recall format is highly resistant to the influence of misinformation 
(Bjorklund et al., 1998, 2000), such that the non-tested participants recalled very little of the 
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peripheral misinformation they encountered (M = .10).  Remarkably, initial testing nearly 
doubled false recall probability for these items (M = .19), t(118) = 2.57, d = .47, p < .02 (refer to 
Figure 3).  False recall of the central items remained low, and no significant RES effect was 
detected (M = .05 for test and M = .03 for no-test), t(118) = 1.16, d = .22, p < .25.  Moreover, 
testing did not affect correct recall probability of the central items (M = .86 for test and M = .88 
for no-test), t < 1, p = .64.  When recall probability of the critical items were examined based on 
time (see bottom of Table 4), it is clear that some participants used the full 25 min for the free 
recall task, although performance appears to begin reaching asymptote during the 20th and 25th 
minute.   
General Discussion 
 Three primary findings emerged from these experiments.  First, initial retrieval 
exacerbated suggestibility regardless of whether the initial test format was cued recall 
(Experiment 1) or free recall (Experiments 2 and 3).  Second, RES occurred regardless of 
whether the final test was cued recall (Experiments 1 and 2) or free recall (Experiment 3).  Third, 
the magnitude of the RES effect was greater for peripheral details than for central details.  These 
results extend the implications of RES to eyewitness suggestibility in legal contexts.  Before 
discussing these implications, we first address whether central details are susceptible to the 
influence of RES. 
Are Central Details Immune to Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility? 
In all three experiments, no significant RES effect was found for the central details.  In 
fact, it appears that the central details were generally immune to misinformation, as recall 
probabilities of the central misinformation were consistently near floor.  Although one might be 
tempted to conclude that central items in a witnessed event represent a boundary for RES, a 
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closer examination suggests a more complex story.  In every experiment, initial testing increased, 
albeit not significantly, the recall probability of the central misinformation items (.06 versus .11 
in Experiment 1, .04 versus .08 in Experiment 2, and .03 versus .05 in Experiment 3).  To further 
scrutinize the influence of initial testing on central misinformation, we increased statistical 
power by pooling the data across all three experiments into a meta-analysis.  The result from this 
analysis shows that initial testing significantly increased false recall of the central items (.04 for 
no-test versus .07 for test), overall d = .25, .95 CI of d =.03 to .48.  Admittedly, this effect is 
small and required the combined power of three experiments to reach statistical significance.  
However, given the difficulty in obtaining a sizable misinformation effect with central items 
(e.g., Heath & Erickson, 1998; Roebers & McConkey, 2003; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001), it is 
quite impressive that initial testing nearly doubled the misinformation effect for these items. This 
finding suggests that central details of a witnessed event may not be immune to the influence of 
RES. 
Applied Implications 
Eyewitnesses are often asked to recount the details of their experience to authorities on 
multiple occasions (e.g., 911 operators, police officers, lawyers, jurors, etc.).  Further, these 
recall attempts represent a small portion of the times a witness will inevitably recall or think 
about a witnessed event.  Any event warranting an eyewitness account is likely of enough 
significance for most people to share with friends and family.  These events are also likely to be 
mentally reviewed spontaneously by the eyewitness.  Such informal retrieval attempts are of 
particular relevance to the present research because they conform more closely to free recall 
(rather than cued recall) protocols.  Moreover, recent evidence has shown that people 
spontaneously recall past events far more often than was previously realized (Hintzman, 2011; 
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Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009).  Thus, the extension of RES to situations employing either cued 
or free recall constitutes a crucial piece of evidence in the generality of the RES phenomenon 
and its potential implications for legal investigations.  The present results might appear to 
contradict those showing that performing an initial Cognitive Interview can reduce subsequent 
eyewitness suggestibility (Gabbert, Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012; Memon, Zaragoza, 
Clifford, & Kidd, 2010).  We caution that significant methodological differences exist between 
these studies and ours, which makes direct comparisons difficult (e.g., Memon et al. asked 
participants to fabricate their own misinformation).  Moreover, whether completing an initial 
Cognitive Interview always reduces people’s susceptibility to subsequent misleading suggestions 
is far from clear at this point, as others have reported either no reduction (Roos af Hjelmsäter, 
Strömwall, & Granhag, 2012) or RES (LaPaglia, Wilford, Rivard, Chan, & Fisher, 2013). 
From an applied perspective, perhaps the most important finding here was that RES 
occurred when both the initial and final tests were free recall.  This finding is particularly notable 
for several reasons:  First, most research on the misinformation effect has used either cued recall 
or recognition as the final test format.  This methodological decision stems from the fact that 
researchers are interested in the effects of misinformation on a particular memory detail.  Asking 
a question about that particular detail naturally provides the best way to assess the effect of 
misinformation on memory for that detail.  This is similar to teachers asking specific questions 
on an exam, because they want to know if students learned the critical, or important, facts.  The 
problem with this approach in the context of eyewitness memory is that cued recall cannot assess 
whether an eyewitness would report misinformation spontaneously (i.e., without direct cues to 
the misinformation-relevant detail).  In legal settings, it is often impossible to know if a person 
has encountered exactly what, if any, misinformation.  Consequently, it is not possible to ask 
RETRIEVAL ENHANCED SUGGESTIBILITY 23 
 
 
specific questions pertaining directly to any misinformation.  If misinformation is not 
spontaneously reported without targeted prompts (as in, e.g., a free recall test), then its influence 
on memory might be more limited in real-world settings than is suggested by research in the 
laboratory.  In Experiment 3, we showed that participants could be induced to report 
misinformation in a free recall test (at least for the peripheral details).  Even more importantly, 
initial testing almost doubled the frequency of reported misinformation in free recall. 
Theoretical Implications 
The data from Experiments 2 and 3 show that completing an initial free recall test can 
increase people’s susceptibility to later presented misinformation.  From a theoretical 
perspective, these data can be accommodated by a modified, broader version of the attention 
allocation account as outlined in the Introduction, which posits that RES occurs because initial 
free recall enhances the learning of subsequent misinformation.  Thus, it seems that initial 
testing, regardless of format, alters how people encode subsequent information (de Winstanley & 
Bjork, 2004; Izawa, 1970; Karpicke, 2009; Son & Kornell, 2008; Thompson, Wenger, & 
Bartling, 1978).   
Although the results are similar across experiments (i.e., they produced a RES effect of 
similar magnitudes), initial cued recall and free recall might have enhanced subsequent encoding 
of the misinformation based on different mechanisms.  When participants were administered a 
cued recall initial test, their attention was drawn to the subsequent misinformation because the 
initial test questions foreshadowed the importance of these specific details.  That is, to some 
extent, participants’ allocation of attention was manipulated by the experimenter; just as 
prequestions can serve to direct students’ attention to particularly important information 
(Hamaker, 1986).  In contrast, because no specific questions were asked in the free recall test, 
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any facilitation of misinformation learning during the postevent narrative phase cannot be 
attributed to experimenter-induced attention to the misinformation.  Instead, the free recall initial 
test likely provided participants with an opportunity to determine what information they could 
and could not recall (Padilla-Walker & Poole, 2002).  When participants listened to the 
misinformation narrative later, they might notice details that were omitted from (most likely for 
the peripheral misinformation), or were inconsistent with (likely for the central items), their 
initial free recall report and thus allocated more effort to encode these details.   
Consistent with this notion, people typically spend more time to encode information that 
they missed on a previous test in multi-trial learning environments (Battig et al., 1965; Son & 
Kornell, 2008; and more broadly, Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994; Son & Metcalfe, 
2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999).  Unlike these studies, where the learner has free control over 
study time, participants had no control over study time in the present study.  Because the 
misinformation was presented via a fixed paced audio narrative, all participants received the 
same amount of time to process each piece of misinformation.  As a result, the increased learning 
of misinformation in the present study must be attributed to more efficient encoding processes 
following testing (see also Karpicke, 2009).  This notion is related to the theoretical account 
proposed by Arnold & McDermott (2013), which posited that free recall potentiated subsequent 
learning due to enhanced organization of the already encoded information.  By asking 
participants to freely recall learned material, they are better able to organize their memory of that 
learned material.  This enhanced organization can lead to better processing of any new or 
unlearned information by increasing one’s awareness that the information is new or unlearned—
prioritizing cognitive resources to anything not incorporated into one’s current memory.  
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Consequently, when a second study opportunity is presented (i.e., the audio narrative), the new 
(mis)information is prioritized and encoded more efficiently.   
The enhanced encoding of misinformation could also be attributed to activation of related 
information during initial testing (Carpenter, 2011; Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006; 
Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012).  That is, during the initial recall phase, information recalled 
explicitly and related information receives some activation, and the activation of this information 
may facilitate subsequent encoding during the misinformation learning phase (i.e., a form of 
long-term semantic priming that is augmented by strategic, controlled processes, Balota, Black, 
& Cheney, 1992; Becker, Moscovitch, Behrmann, & Joordens, 1997; Chan et al., 2006).  Note 
that none of the discussed accounts are mutually exclusive and that a constellation of factors 
could be contributing to RES. 
Conclusions 
Our findings show that initial recall can increase subsequent eyewitness suggestibility 
regardless of the recall test format.  Contrary to the idea that RES is contingent on an initial cued 
recall test that draws attention to the later misinformation, the present results indicate that the 
RES effect might be more pervasive than previously thought.  Overall, the effect has been found 
in free recall, cued recall, recognition (Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Thomas et al., 2010), and source 
discrimination (Chan et al., 2012); it occurs at delays of 30 min, 48 hr, and a week between the 
witnessed event and final test (regardless of whether the misinformation occurs before or after 
the delay, Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011), and it is found in both between- and 
within-subjects comparisons (Chan & LaPaglia, 2011).   
Although RES appears to be robust, it is, fortunately, not universal.  First, initial testing 
can enhance subsequent eyewitness memory performance in the absence of misinformation.  
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Moreover, a number of studies have found that initial testing can enhance, instead of impair, 
memory performance even in the face of misinformation (Pansky & Tenenboim, 2010; Thomas 
et al., 2010).  It would be fruitful for future research to attempt to pinpoint when repeated 
retrieval can exacerbate and when it can inoculate against eyewitness suggestibility (LaPaglia & 
Chan, 2013).  Granted, providing answers to such questions will require a series of systematic 
and careful investigations.  However, given the prevalence and frequency that eyewitnesses are 
asked to retrieve information in the process of a criminal investigation, a more thorough 
understanding of the effects of retrieval on suggestibility would be instrumental to devising 
techniques and policies to enhance the accuracy of eyewitness evidence. 
The present research primarily serves to demonstrate the generality of RES.  The 
extension of RES to protocols using free recall poses important implications for legal contexts.  
RES also adds an interesting dimension to the literature on test-potentiated learning or the 
interim test effect by demonstrating that the improvements in long-term recall might extend to 
both true and false information.  Broadly speaking, at its core, RES contributes to a long line of 
research that continues to further our understanding of retrieval processes in human memory 
(Schacter, Eich, & Tulving, 1978).  
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Table 1 
Probability and Confidence of Response for Neutral Items in Experiments 1-3 
 Response Type 
 Correct Other Intrusions No Answer 
    
Experiment 1    
Initial Cued Recall  .83 (.19) .12 (.16) .05 (.11) 
Confidence 3.86 (.49) 2.55 (1.06) 1.14 (.38) 
Final Cued Recall    
No-test .83 (.18) .15 (.15) .02 (.05) 
Confidence 3.84 (.51) 2.34 (1.18) 2.33 (1.53) 
Test .87 (.15) .10 (.29) .03 (.06) 
Confidence 3.86 (.59) 1.20 (.45) 2.95 (1.19) 
    
Experiment 2    
Initial Free Recall  .27 (.20) .00 (.00) .73 (.20) 
Final Cued Recall    
No-test .71 (.27) .20 (.19) .09 (.17) 
Confidence 3.89 (.80) 2.81 (1.14) 1.50 (.99) 
Test .76 (.21) .20 (.20) .04 (.08) 
Confidence 3.96 (.77) 1.46 (.88) 2.38 (1.05) 
    
Experiment 3    
Initial Free Recall  .29 (.18) .03 (.07) .68 (.18) 
Final Free Recall    
No-test .36 (.21) .02 (.05) .63 (.20) 
Test .44 (.22) .03 (.08) .54 (.20) 
    
 
Note.  For the free recall tests, “No Answer” responses refer to omissions (i.e., details that 
participants did not mention in their free recall report).  Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses.  Confidence ratings were obtained only for cued recall. 
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Table 2 
Probability of Response and Confidence on Initial Tests As a Function of Item Type and 
Response Type for Experiments 1-3  
 Response Type 
 Correct Other Intrusions No Answer 
Baserate False 
Recall 
     
Experiment 1     
Central Items .62 (.26) .33 (.23) .04 (.10) .01 (.03) 
Confidence 4.64 (.78) 4.52 (.72) 2.53 (1.12) 5.00 (.00) 
Peripheral Items .40 (.21) .40 (.17) .09 (.12)      .11 (.09) 
Confidence 3.61 (.76) 3.09 (1.07) 1.15 (.32) 3.72 (.96) 
     
Experiment 2     
Central Items .72 (.24) .00 (.02) .26 (.24) .02 (.05) 
Peripheral Items .21 (.15) .01 (.05) .74 (.24) .04 (.20) 
     
Experiment 3     
Central Items .85 (.17) .01 (.04) .14 (.17) .01 (.03) 
Peripheral Items .21 (.14) .04 (.08) .72 (.15)     .03 (.07) 
     
 
Note.  The initial test was cued recall in Experiment 1 and free recall in Experiments 2 and 3.  
For Experiments 2 and 3, “No Answer” refers to omissions (i.e., details that participants did not 
mention in their free recall report).  Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  Confidence 
ratings were obtained only for cued recall. 
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Table 3 
Mean Confidence on Final Tests As a Function of Item Type and Response Type for Experiments 
1-2, Experiment 3 is Excluded Because the Final Test was Free Recall and Therefore Did not 
Include Confidence Ratings 
 Response Type 
 Correct Other Intrusions No Answer 
Baserate False 
Recall 
     
Experiment 1     
Final Cued Recall Test     
No-test     
Central Items 4.68 (.39) 4.40 (.73) 3.58 (1.17) 4.50 (.50) 
Peripheral Items 3.79 (1.11) 3.38 (1.15) 1.50 (.60)   3.59 (1.11) 
Test     
Central Items 4.67 (.40) 4.46 (.54)       N/A 4.47 (.85) 
Peripheral Items 3.99 (.70) 3.33 (1.17) 2.40 (1.52) 3.92 (.89) 
     
Experiment 2     
Final Cued Recall Test     
No-test     
Central Items 4.74 (.41) 4.26 (.88) 2.11 (1.58) 3.82 (1.14) 
Peripheral Items 3.85 (.98) 3.20 (.95) 1.72 (1.11) 3.51 (.90) 
Test     
Central Items 4.64 (.65) 4.27 (.80) 3.21 (1.95) 4.08 (.88) 
Peripheral Items 4.02 (.88) 3.31 (.91) 1.32 (.56) 3.57 (1.09) 
     
 
Note.  Standard deviations appear in parentheses.   
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Table 4 
The Mean Cumulative Proportions of Accurately Reported Neutral, Peripheral, and Central 
Items at Each 5 Min Interval of the Free Recall Tests, Experiment 1 is Excluded Because It Did 
Not Include Any Free Recall Tests. 
 Response Time 
 5 min 10 min 15 min 20 min 25 min 
      
Experiment 2      
Initial Free Recall Test      
Central Items .15 (.06) .26 (.13) .47 (.22) .73 (.24)  
Peripheral Items .03 (.07) .08 (.10) .15 (.14) .21 (.15)  
Neutral Items .04 (.07) .11 (.13) .18 (.17) .28 (.20)  
      
Experiment 3      
Initial Free Recall Test      
Central Items .17 (.09) .39 (.20) .64 (.24) .85 (.17)  
Peripheral Items .02 (.06) .06 (.09) .14 (.11) .21 (.14)  
Neutral Items .04 (.07) .12 (.12) .19 (.14) .29 (.18)  
 
Final Free Recall Test 
     
Central Items .18 (.09) .44 (.21) .71 (.23) .83 (.18) .87 (.16) 
Peripheral Items .03 (.07) .11 (.11) .16 (.12) .19 (.13) .21 (.13) 
Neutral Items .05 (.08) .15 (.13) .25 (.17) .33 (.20) .40 (.22) 
      
 
Note.  Standard deviations appear in parentheses.   
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Figure 1. Results from Experiment 1 with an initial and final cued recall test: probability of a 
correct and false (misinformation) response as a function of item type (central or peripheral), and 
whether subjects had received an initial cued recall test prior to misinformation exposure via the 
audio narrative (test versus no-test conditions).  The error bars represent the .95 confidence 
intervals for each between-subjects comparison (Masson & Loftus, 2003).     
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Figure 2. Results from Experiment 2 with an initial free recall test and final cued recall test: 
probability of a correct and false (misinformation) response as a function of item type (central or 
peripheral) and whether subjects had received an initial free recall test prior to misinformation 
exposure via the audio narrative (test versus no-test conditions).  The error bars represent the .95 
confidence intervals for each between-subjects comparison.     
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Figure 3. Results from Experiment 3 with an initial and final free recall test: probability of a 
correct and false (misinformation) response as a function of item type (central or peripheral) and 
whether subjects had received an initial free recall test prior to misinformation exposure via the 
audio narrative (test versus no-test conditions).  The error bars represent the .95 confidence 
intervals for each between-subjects comparison.     
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Appendix 
Central Misinformation Items 
1. The video began with the burglar on the roof of a building.  How did the burglar get from the 
roof of the building he started on, to the roof of the museum? 
[Correct Answer: Slid down a cable with use of crossbow, Misinformation Version A: 
Swung on a rope, Misinformation Version B: Jumped] 
2. In the video, how did the burglar get under the alarm beams undetected when advancing to 
the room with the diamond? 
[Correct Answer: Used the crossbow to shoot a rope and pull himself, Misinformation 
Version A: Used his arms to crawl forward on his belly, Misinformation Version B: Used 
his legs to slowly propel himself on his back] 
3. After getting to the room with the diamond in the video, how did the burglar remove the 
dome-shaped glass case covering the diamond? 
[Correct Answer: Used the crossbow to shoot a rope and make a pulley, Misinformation 
Version A: Picked it up carefully with his hands, Misinformation Version B: Used the 
mechanical arms to remove it] 
4. When the burglar worked to retrieve the diamond in the video, what apparatus, if any, is used 
to retrieve the diamond?   
[Correct Answer: Two silver, metal arms (2 & 3 pronged), Misinformation Version A: 
Two identical black claws (3-pronged), Misinformation Version B: One silver 
mechanical arm (3-pronged)] 
5. Once the burglar had stolen the diamond, a glove was put in its place, what was the color of 
the glove that the burglar put in place of the diamond?   
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[Correct Answer: White, Misinformation Version A: Black, Misinformation Version B: 
Silver] 
6. In the video, how did one of the guards finally discover that there was something going 
wrong in the museum? 
[Correct Answer: Sees the glove in place of the diamond, Misinformation Version A: Sees 
the burglar, Misinformation B: Hears the burglar] 
Peripheral Misinformation Items 
7. As the burglar entered the roof of the museum in the video, the entrance was of a particular 
shape.  What shape was it?   
[Correct Answer: Octagonal, Misinformation Version A: Circular, Misinformation 
Version B: Square] 
8. In the video, upon entering the museum, the burglar found himself in a dimly lit hallway 
area, what color were the walls painted? 
[Correct Answer: White or Off-White, Misinformation Version A: Beige, Misinformation 
Version B: Grey] 
9. Describe the pedestal, which was used to hold the large baseball-shaped diamond in the big 
room in the video.   
[Correct Answer: Glass, hourglass-shaped, Misinformation Version A: Marble dolphins, 
Misinformation Version B: Marble cupids] 
10. In the video, a piece of artwork was present on the ceiling of the big room (where the burglar 
stole the diamond).  Describe what the artwork looked like and be as specific as possible 
(e.g., what patterns were present in the artwork, etc.).   
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[Correct Answer: Wooden, brown circular patterns, Misinformation Version A: Knights 
charging, Misinformation Version B: David & Goliath] 
11. In the video, the glove had the letter P embellished on it, what color was the letter 
embellished on the glove? 
[Correct Answer: Silver, Misinformation Version A: White, Misinformation Version B: 
Gold] 
12. In the video, all the museum guards wore hats as part of their uniform, what color were the 
hats the guards wore? 
[Correct Answer: Dark green, Misinformation Version A: Tan, Misinformation Version 
B: Dark brown] 
Neutral Items 
13. In the video, when the two museum guards were shown talking, they were standing in front 
of what appeared to be a stained glass window.  Please describe the design of this window as 
specifically as possible (e.g., colors, patterns, etc).  
[Correct Answer: Simple shapes, yellow, red, blue] 
14. In addition to the stained glass window, what large objects were shown in the video shot of 
the two guards talking? 
[Correct Answer: Two Greek statues, white, stone] 
15. In the video, the dome-shaped glass case that covered the diamond had a handle on it, what 
shape was the handle of this case? 
[Correct Answer: Moon-shaped, crescent] 
16. In the video, a carpet was placed underneath the diamond stand in the large room and 
surrounded by velvet ropes. Describe the carpet (size, color, pattern, etc.).   
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[Correct Answer: Red, octagonal] 
17. In the video, the alarm is eventually set off, please describe who set the alarm off and how. 
[Correct Answer: The guard accidentally set it off upon seeing the glove] 
18. As the burglar escaped from the museum in the video, the guards began to shoot at him, how 
many guards were shooting at the burglar as he got away?   
[Correct Answer: 3] 
 
 
